Now it is certainly the case that once in the euro, exiting it is not a path any government would willingly contemplate. Without the second bailout of €130bn, Greece would not have had the money to redeem the €14bn of bonds which fall due on 20 March. The resulting default would mark the start of a process of national bankruptcy which in the first order would mean state pensions, wages, contracts and medical bills not being paid. From there, the insolvency would multiply outwards into the already deeply impaired private sector, where many businesses would find it impossible to stay afloat.

To exit the euro would further savage the private savings market, much of which would be wiped out by devaluation and cascading bankruptcy. An immediate, and violent economic contraction would occur, followed in short order by a likely inflationary tsunami.

The first wave of the inflation would come from devaluation, the second from compensating wage demands, and the third from a central bank forced to monetise the still yawning budget deficit.

It is no surprise, then, that Greece’s technocrats, backed by a substantial majority of its existing politicians, have turned their back on such a course.

But is it really any worse than the one chosen? Repeated rounds of austerity are proving self defeating, which makes it virtually certain that Greece will eventually have to come back for more. What are Europe’s paymasters to demand then?